Presumption Rules Try to Indicate if Fact Can, Should Be Inferred by North, John E.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 53 | Issue 3 Article 4
1974
Presumption Rules Try to Indicate if Fact Can,
Should Be Inferred
John E. North
Omaha, Nebraska, and American Bar Associations, member, jnorth@mcgrathnorth.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
John E. North, Presumption Rules Try to Indicate if Fact Can, Should Be Inferred, 53 Neb. L. Rev. 347 (1974)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol53/iss3/4
By John E. North*
Presumption Rules Try To Indicate
If Fact Can, Should Be Inferred
I. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. Inferring Facts
The existence of a fact is quite often established by inference.
Fact A and Fact B are proven and from these facts Fact C is in-
ferred. This is a common occurrence in ordinary, everyday rea-
soning. However, judicial refinements of this logical process leave
something to be desired. In most situations, a judicial determina-
tion relating to an inferred fact is the outgrowth of -an inquiry
into the sufficiency of the evidence to support the inference. In
any given situation, a court may reach the conclusion that based
upon the facts and circumstances established by the evidence: (a)
the inferred fact cannot reasonably and logically be inferred; (b)
the inferred fact must be inferred; or (c) the inferred fact may,
but need not, be inferred.
Since judges are fallible, results are sometimes irreconcilable in
cases involving substantially similar evidence. The courts and leg-
islatures sought to remedy the situation by establishing "presump-
tions," i.e., legal ground rules which would indicate in certain situa-
tions that a fact could be inferred or in other situations that a
fact should be inferred. Their efforts brought chaos out of chaos.
Legislative and judicial adoption of presumptions without a clear
indication of their effect merely compounded the confusion.
B. Effects of Presumptions
Is a presumption evidence? In Nebraska,' and most jurisdictions, 2
• LL.B. 1948, Creighton University; LL.M. with distinction 1949, Duke
University. Former professor of law, Creighton University, 1949-1970.
Member Omaha, Nebraska and American Bar Associations.
1. In re Estate of Drake, 150 Neb. 568, 35 N.W.2d 417 (1948); Witthauer
v. Paxton-Mitchell Co., 146 Neb. 436, 19 N.W.2d 865 (1945).
2. Annots., 34 A.L.R. 938, 951 (1925); 47 A.L.R. 968 (1927) listing cases
supporting the view that presumptions are not evidence.
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courts have given a negative response to this question. 3 If a pre-
sumption is not evidence, what is its effect? A recent survey dis-
closes the following:
Legal scholars have divided the effects of a presumption into
seven basic groups. The first suggested effect is that introduction
of basic facts shifts the risk of not introducing evidence sufficient
to support the nonexistence of the presumption to the opposing
party. In simpler terms, if the opposing party fails to provide re-
buttal evidence, the presumption will continue to affect the trier-
of-fact's final determination, but if the opposing party gives
enough evidence to support the nonexistence of the presumption,
it will disappear. This effect is better known as Professor
Thayer's "bursting bubble" theory. Many problems arise in the
context of the "bursting bubble" theory which will be discussed
later in this comment. The second effect which is an outgrowth
of the first, places the burden of producing "substantial" evidence
on the opposing party to show the nonexistence of the presump-
tion.
Where the opposing party must give evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding of the nonexistence of the presumption, a third ef-
fect allows the trier of fact discretion whether to believe the evi-
dence of the opposing party. Under this view the presumption
exists until the trier of fact actually determines its nonexistence.
A fourth theory states that the presumption exists until the trier
of fact finds that the presumption's nonexistence is at least as
probable as its existence. The Pennsylvania rule, the fifth theory
of effect, goes one step further and states that the presumption
exists until the trier of fact finds that its nonexistence is more
probable than its existence. As will be shown shortly, this theory
actually affects the burden of persuasion. A sixth classification,
which coincides with one of the justifications for presumptions, is
that the presumption has the effect of placing the burden of pro-
ducing evidence on the opposing party when he has access to the
evidence. In such a case, it is held that the nonintroducing party
has both the burden of disproving the existence of the presumption
and the burden of persuasion. The final suggested effect of a
presumption is that when evidence is introduced to prove its non-
existence, the trier of fact-while he need not assume the pre-
sumption-will use the presumption as evidence of the existence
of the basic fact. In most of the above cases where the presump-
tion disappears, it is generally felt that, regardless of its elimina-
tion, the basic facts leading to the presumption remain in effect
and are considered by the trier of fact the same as other facts.4
3. In some jurisdictions, courts have said that a presumption is evi-
dence. See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895); Free-
man v. Blount, 172 Ala. 655, 55 So. 293 (1911); Webb v. State, 11
Ga. App. 850, 76 S.E. 990 (1912); Wood v. Sovereign Camp of Wood-
men of the World, 166 Iowa 391, 147 N.W. 888 (1914); State v. Wolf-
ley, 75 Kan. 406, 93 P. 337 (1907); City Motor Trucking Co. v.
Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 116 Ore. 102, 239 P. 812 (1925). But see Holt
v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
4. Comment, Judicial Notice and Presumptions Under the Proposed Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 135, 154-55 (1969).
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The Model Code of Evidence (hereinafter "Model Code") con-
tains a similar survey of the effect of presumptions in various ju-
risdictions.5
Nebraska courts have not been immune from the presumption
problem. The following somewhat ill-defined categories have de-
veloped in this state:
(a) Rule of Law
A conclusive presumption cannot be rebutted by the opponent;
it is in effect a rule of substantive law.6 For example, a person
is conclusively presumed to know the law and evidence that such
person did not in fact know the law is inadmissible.7 Similarly,
a person is conclusively presumed to know the vicious nature of
a wild animal,8 and evidence of such knowledge is unnecessary and
irrelevant. When the presumed fact must be accepted as true, i.e.
it is not subject to disproof by rebuttal evidence once the basic
facts which give rise to the inference are established, the process
does not involve an inference or presumption in any real sense
at all. The basic facts are essential elements of a cause of action
and a rule of substantive law comes into play to determine conclu-
sively that the presumed fact exists.
(b) Discharging the Burden of Producing Evidence
The burden of proof is an equivocal term which normally in-
cludes two concepts.
1. The burden of producing evidence; and
2. The burden of persuasion."
The person having the burden of producing evidence must produce
sufficient evidence from which reasonable minds could infer the
existence of the fact he has to prove. If he does not produce the
required evidence, he will be subject to a motion to dismiss because
he has failed to discharge his burden of producing evidence.10
5. MODEL CODE OF EvnaEcXE Introductory Note at 306 (1942) [herein-
after cited as MODEL CODE].
6. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Early v. People, 142 Colo. 462,
352 P.2d 112 (1960).
7. Satterfield v. State, 172 Neb. 275, 109 N.W.2d 415 (1961).
8. Crunk v. Glover, 167 Neb. 816, 95 N.W.2d 135 (1959).
9. See Kucaba v. Kucaba, 146 Neb. 116, 18 N.W.2d 645 (1945). Compare
C. McComvcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVmENCE § 336 at 783 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRmvIC].
10. State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 168 Neb. 298, 96 N.W.
2d 55 (1959).
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Sometimes a presumption will come into play and assist the propo-
nent in discharging his burden of producing evidence. Under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, if a thing which causes injury is
shown to be under the defendant's control and management, and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have management use proper care, the facts
of the occurrence permit, but do not compel, an inference of negli-
gence, and afford reasonable evidence, in the absence of an expla-
nation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want
of proper care.1 In a sense the res ispa loquitur type of "pre-
sumption" takes the place of evidence and fills a void in the pro-
ponent's proof. In other words, the law permits the trier of fact
to reach a factual conclusion from the evidence presented which
might not be a proper conclusion if the usual rule of reason were
followed. The legislative or judicial presumption created in situa-
tions similar to the res ipsa loquitur situation is usually justified
on the ground that the opponent may have better access to the
evidence and should be required to come forward with it or subject
himself to the possibility of an unfavorable jury verdict.
(c) Shifting the Burden of Producing Evidence
Under the classic definition of a presumption, as stated by
Thayer, once a presumption arises, it shifts the burden of produc-
ing evidence.' 2 If evidence to rebut the presumed fact is intro-
duced, the "bubble bursts" and the presumption disappears.'2 The
Supreme Court of Nebraska has described the Thayer type pre-
sumption as follows:
A disputable presumption is a rule of law to be laid down by
the court, which shifts to the party against whom it operates the
burden of evidence, merely. It points out the party on whom lies
the duty of going forward with evidence on the fact presumed.
And when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably
tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the office
of the presumption is performed, and the fact in question is to
be established by evidence as are other questions of fact, without
aid from the presumption, which has become functus officio. To
translate this statement into the language of this Court, all such
presumptions are locative, merely. A presumption, of itself alone,
11. Nownes v. Hillside Lounge, Inc., 179 Neb. 157, 137 N.W.2d 361 (1965);
Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co., 159 Neb. 23, 65 N.W.2d 224 (1954); Mi-
ratsky v. Beseda, 139 Neb. 229, 297 N.W. 94 (1941); Comment, Res
Ipsa Loquitur-An Analysis of its Application and Procedural Effect
in Nebraska, 41 NEB. L. REV. 747 (1962).
12. J. THAYER, A PRELImINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAw 313-52 (1898) [hereinafter cited as THAYER].
13. 9 J. WIGmORE, EvIDENcE §§ 2487, 2491 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMORE].
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contributes no evidence and has no probative quality. It takes the
place of evidence, temporarily, at least, but if and when enough
rebutting evidence is admitted to make a question for the jury on
the fact involved, the presumption disappears and goes for naught.
In such a case, the presumption does not have to be overcome by
evidence; once it is confronted by evidence of the character re-
ferred to, it immediately quits the arena.14
In Nebraska, the Thayer type presumption has the following ef-
fects: (1) the presumption shifts the burden of producing evidence;
(2) the presumption is not itself evidence and not to be weighed
by the jury as evidence; and (3) when evidence is introduced suf-
ficient to satisfy the judge that reasonable minds could either find
the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact, the presump-
tion disappears.15 Depending upon the quantum of evidence rele-
vant to the basic and presumed fact, the effect of this type of pre-
sumption in typical situations has been summarized as follows:
1. If the party relying on the presumption fails to produce
sufficient evidence from which reasonable minds could infer the
existence of the basic facts, the presumed fact never arises. Conse-
quently the presumption does not enter the case.
2. If the person relying upon the presumption produces suffi-
cient evidence from which reasonable minds could infer the exist-
ence of the basic facts, the presumption arises and either one of
two results will follow:
a. If the opponent fails to introduce any evidence relating
to the presumed fact the case goes to the jury under instruc-
tions treating the presumption as a rule of law; i.e., the jury
is instructed that if they find the existence of the basic facts
from the evidence presented to them, they must find the exist-
ence of the presumed fact as a matter of law.
b. If the opponent of the presumption introduces evidence
relating to the presumed fact from which reasonable minds
could infer that the presumed fact does not exist, the presump-
tion disappears, and the case should be submitted to the jury
without any instruction relating to the presumption at all. The
presumption having disappeared, no mention is made of it, and
the jurors are left free to infer, or not to infer, the existence
of the presumed fact upon the basis of all of the evidence pre-
sented to them.
3. If the proponent of the presumption introduces so much evi-
dence that reasonable minds would be required to infer the exist-
ence of the basic facts then the opponent has two alternatives:
a. The opponent may introduce evidence tending to rebut
14. Patrick v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 150 Neb. 201, 204-05, 33 N.W.2d
537, 540 (1948) quoting Tyrrell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 109
Vt. 6, 23-24, 192 A. 184, 192 (1937). See also In re Estate of Hunter,
151 Neb. 704, 39 N.W.2d 418 (1949).
15. In re Estate of Drake, 150 Neb. 568, 35 N.W.2d 417 (1948); Iln re Estate
of Goist, 146 Neb. 1, 18 N.W.2d 513 (1945) Bohmont v. Moore, 138
Neb. 784, 295 N.W. 419 (1940).
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the existence of the basic facts and create a question of fact
which goes to the jury on the basic facts. If all of the op-
ponent's evidence related to the basic facts, then the case
should be submitted to the jury with an instruction treating
the presumption as a rule of law; i.e., if the jurors find the
existence of the basic facts, they must find the existence of the
presumed facts.
b. The opponent alternatively may introduce evidence re-
lating to the presumed fact, and if reasonable minds from the
evidence presented by the opponent could infer that the pre-
sumed fact does not exist, then the presumption disappears and
the case goes to the jury without any instruction relating to
the presumption, as indicated above.16
(d) Allocating the Burden of Persuasion
The function of some presumptions is simply to allocate the bur-
den of persuasion. There is a presumption that one accused of
a crime is innocent, and this presumption exists until sufficient
evidence is introduced to overcome it. 1 7 This presumption is de-
scribed to the jury as follows:
The defendant is presumed to be innocent.
This presumption of innocence is evidence in favor of the de-
fendant and continues throughout the trial, until he shall have
been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.18
This presumption is used as a method of describing the principle
that the state has the burden of persuading the jury that the de-
fendant is guilty. It is in effect an amplification of the prosecu-
tion's burden of persuasion, but really adds little substance to the
existing requirement that the state persuade the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.19
There are other presumptions which are given the same effect
as the presumption of innocence. In federal tax cases, there is a
presumption that the determination of a deficiency made by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is correct, the sole effect of
which is to place the burden of persuasion on the taxpayer.20 There
is a presumption that a child born of a married woman during
wedlock is presumed to be child of the individual who was her
husband at the time of conception, and this presumption also shifts
the burden of persuasion to the party against whom it operates.2 '
These presumptions support Morgan's theory that a presumption
16. D. Dow & J. NoRTH, NEBRAsKA EVIENCE 2-4, 2-5 (State Bar, 1969).
17. Bartley v. State, 53 Neb. 310, 73 N.W. 744 (1898).
18. NEBRAsKA JuRY INSRUcTIONS 14.07 (1969); Behrens v. State, 140 Neb.
671, 1 N.W.2d 289 (1941).
19. McCouMvCK § 342.
20. Morse v. United States, 371 F.2d 474 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
21. Hudson v. Hudson, 151 Neb. 210, 36 N.W.2d 851 (1949).
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should have the effect of placing the burden of persuasion of the
issue on the party against whom it operates. 22
II. PRIOR CODIFICATIONS
Codifying the basic effect of a presumption is not a new prob-
lem. The drafters of both the Model Code and the Uniform Rules
of Evidence (hereinafter "Uniform Rules") struggled for a palat-
able solution.
A. The Model Code
The Model Code released in 1942 states: "Presumption means
that when a basic fact exists, the existence of another fact must
be assumed, whether or not the other fact may be rationally found
from the basic fact."23 In general, "when the basic fact of a pre-
sumption has been established in an action, the existence of the
presumed fact must be assumed unless and until evidence has been
introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence."2 4
When evidence has been introduced which would support a finding
of the nonexistence of the presumed fact, "the existence or non-
existence of the presumed fact is to be determined exactly as if
no presumption had ever been applicable in the action.125 The
Model Code adopts the Thayer approach: a presumption merely
shifts the burden of producing evidence "and should be ad-
ministered so that the jury never hear the word presumption." 26
It seems clear that the rule of the Model Code could not be applied
in federal criminal cases. The United States Supreme Court has
recently and emphatically restated the rule that a presumption (in
criminal cases) is unconstitutional unless there is some rational
connection between the facts proved and the facts presumed.27
With the exception of this deficiency, the Model Code was at the
time it was drafted a reasonably accurate reflection of the mean-
ing of presumptions adopted by a considerable number of courts.
B. The Uniform Rules
In 1953, the drafters of the Uniform Rules defined a presump-
tion as "an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which
requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group of
22. MODEL CODE, Foreward at 57 (1942).
23. MODEL CODErule 701(2) (1942).
24. Id. rule 704(1).
25. Id. rule 704(2).
26. Id. Comment (2) (b).
27. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Tot v. United States, 319
U.S. 463 (1943).
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facts found or otherwise established in the action."28  This rule
is sufficiently broad to include "conclusive" or "irrebuttable pre-
sumptions" which are in fact substantive rules of law. 29 The basic
fact can be established by the pleadings, stipulation of the parties,
judicial notice or production of sufficient evidence. 30 Morgan sug-
gested that a presumption should have the effect of placing the
burden of persuasion on the issue on the party against whom it
operates.3' Rule 14 of the Uniform Rules contains the essence of
Morgan's suggestion. Under the rules, if the basic fact has some
logical value in proving the presumed fact, the burden of estab-
lishing the nonexistence of the presumed fact is on the party
against whom the presumption operates.32 The phrase "burden of
establishing" contained in the Uniform Rule is not defined; how-
ever, it undoubtedly means the burden of persuading the jury of
the nonexistence of the presumed fact by the necessary evidence.33
When there is no rational connection between the basic fact and
the presumed fact, the presumption merely shifts the burden of
producing evidence and not the burden of persuasion under the
Uniform Rules.34
III. THE FEDERAL RULE
Comparing the Model Code with the Uniform Rules would lead
one to agree with Morgan that "every writer of sufficient intelli-
gence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject matter has ap-
proached the topic of presumptions with a sense of hopelessness
and left it with a feeling of despair."335 The drafters of the Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence (hereinafter "Federal Rule [s]" or
"federal proposal") are no exception. From the initial draft pre-
sented by the United States Supreme Court Committee on the
Rules to the most recent legislative amendment, the definition of
"presumption" has come full circle.
A. Presumptions in Criminal Cases
The original draft issued in March 1969 contained the following
rule for presumptions in federal criminal cases:
28. UmiFORmV RULE OF EVIDENCE 13 [hereinafter UNIFoR RULE].
29. E. MORGAN, J. MAGUIRE & J. WEMSTEIN, EVIDENCE 439 (4th ed. 1957).
30. UiFomR RULE 13; Morgan, The Law-of Evidence, 1941-1946, 59 HARv.
L. REV. 481, 495 (1946).
31. MODEL CODE, Foreward at 57 (1942).
32. UmFoRm RULE 14 (a).
33. MeBaine, Burden of Proof; Presumption, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 13, 24-28
(1954); Morgan, Presumptions, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 513-14 (1956).
34. UmFoR RuLE 14(b).
35. Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WAsH. L. REv. 255 (1937).
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(a) Scope. In criminal cases, presumptions against an ac-
cused, recognized at common law or created by statute, including
statutory provisions that certain facts are prima facie evidence of
other facts or of guilt, are governed by this rule, unless otherwise
provided by Act of Congress.
(b) Submission To Jury. The judge is not authorized to di-
rect the jury to find a presumed fact against the accused. When
the presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense
or negatives a defense, the judge may submit the question of guilt
or of the existence of the presumed fact to the jury, if, but only
if, a reasonable juror on the evidence as a whole, including the
evidence of the basic facts, could find guilt or the presumed fact
beyond a reasonable doubt. Under other presumptions, the exist-
ence of the presumed fact may be submitted to the jury if the
basic facts are supported by substantial evidence, or are otherwise
established, unless the evidence as a whole negatives the existence
of the presumed fact.
(c) Instructing The Jury. Whenever the existence of a pre-
sumed fact against the accused is submitted to the jury, the judge
shall give an instruction that the law declares that the jury may
regard the basic facts as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact
but does not require it to do so. In addition, if the presumed fact
establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a de-
fense, the judge shall instruct the jury that its existence must, on
all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.36
The foregoing rule was based largely upon the American Law Insti-
tute's Model Penal Code37 and United States v. Gainey.38  In Gai-
ney, the Court had sustained the validity of Title 26 of the United
States Code, section 5601(b) which stated that presence at the site
is sufficient to convict of the offense of carrying on the business
of distiller without giving bond unless the presence is expalined
to the jury's satisfaction. The Advisory Committee relied upon
the following conclusions reached by the Court:
The power of the judge to withdraw a case from the jury for
insufficiency of evidence is left unimpaired; he may submit the
case on the basis of presence alone, but he is not required to do
so. Nor is he precluded from rendering judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. It is proper to tell the jury about the "statutory infer-
ence," if they are told it is not conclusive. The jury may still
acquit, even if it finds defendant present and his presence is unex-
plained. (Compare the mandatory character of the instruction
condemned in Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1945)).
To avoid any implication that the statutory language relative to
explanation be taken as directing attention to failure of the ac-
cused to testify, the better practice, said the Court, would be to
instruct the jury that they may draw the inference unless the evi-
36. Piop. FED. R. EviD. 3-01 (Prelim. Draft, 1969).
37. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 (5) (Prelim. Offic. Draft 1962).
38. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
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dence provides a satisfactory explanation of defendant's presence,
omitting any explicit reference to the statute.39
Although the Federal Rules were published, circulated for com-
ment and revised by the Supreme Court, no substantial change
was made in the rule relating to presumptions in federal criminal
cases as that rule was finally adopted by the Supreme Court.40
When the Federal Rules were transmitted to Congress, they
were referred to the House of Representative's Committee on the
Judiciary. This committee deleted the Rule relating to presump-
tions in federal criminal cases because
the subject of presumptions in criminal cases is addressed in de-
tail in bills now pending before the Committee to revise the fed-
eral criminal code. The Committee determined to consider this
question in the course of its study of these proposals.4 '
The House version of the Federal Rules, H.R. 5463, was adopted
by the House on February 6, 1974, without any provision at all
for presumptions in federal criminal cases.4 2  The study com-
menced by the Judicial Conference in March 1961 is not yet over,
and to date, there is little or no indication which rule will govern
federal courts in applying presumptions in criminal cases.
B. Presumptions in Civil Cases
The March 1969 draft contained the following rule for presump-
tions in federal civil cases:
(a) Scope. Presumptions in all cases not otherwise provided
for by Act of Congress or by these rules are governed by this rule.
(b) Effect of Presumption. A presumption imposes on the
party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the
nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its ex-
istence.
(c) Procedure.
(1) Determination of Evidence of Basis Facts. When no
evidence is introduced contrary to the existence of the pre-
sumed fact, the question of its existence depends upon the ex-
istence of the basic facts and is determined as follows:
(A) If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that
the evidence renders the existence of the basic facts more
probable than not, the judge shall direct the jury to find
in favor of the existence of the presumed fact; or
(B) If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that
the evidence does not render the existence of the basic facts
39. PROP. FED. R. EviD. 3-01, Advisory Committee's Note (Prelim. Draft
1969).
40. PROP. FED. R. EviD. 303.
41. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973).
42. 120 CONG. REc. H541, H570 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
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more probable than not, the judge shall direct the jury to
find against the existence of the presumed fact; or
(C) If reasonable minds would not necessarily agree as
to whether the evidence renders the existence of the basic
facts more probable than not, the judge shall submit the
matter to the jury with an instruction to find in favor of
the existence of the presumed fact if they find from the evi-
dence that the existence of the basic facts is more probable
than not, but otherwise to find against the existence of the
presumed fact.
(2) Determination On Evidence Of Presumed Fact. When
reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the evidence
renders the existence of the basic facts more probable than not,
the question of the existence of the presumed fact is determined
as follows:
(A) If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that
the evidence renders the nonexistence of the presumed fact
more probable than not, the judge shall direct the jury to
find against the existence of the presumed fact; or
(B) If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that
the evidence does not render the nonexistence of the pre-
sumed fact more probable than not, the judge shall direct
the jury to find in favor of the presumed fact; or
(C) If reasonable minds would not necessarily agree as
to whether the evidence renders the nonexistence of the pre-
sumed fact more probable than not, the judge shall submit
the matter to the jury with an instruction to find in favor
of the existence of the presumed fact unless they find from
the evidence that its nonexistence is more probable than its
existence, in which event they should find against its exist-
ence.
(3) Determination of Evidence of Both Basic and Presumed
Facts. When evidence as to the existence of the basic facts
is such that reasonable minds would not necessarily agree
whether their existence is more probable than not and evidence
as to the nonexistence of the presumed fact is such that they
would not necessarily agree that its nonexistence is more prob-
able than not, the judge shall submit the matter to the jury
with an instruction to find in favor of the existence of the pre-
sumed fact if they find from the evidence that the existence
of the basic facts is more probable than not and unless they
find the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than
not, otherwise to find against the existence of the presumed
fact.43
The Advisory Committee concluded that any doubt as to the con-
stitutional permissibility of a presumption imposing a burden of
persuasion of the nonexistence of the presumed fact in civil cases
was laid to rest in Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co.4 4  Since
43. PRop. FED. R. Evim. 3-03 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
44. 359 U.S. 437 (1969); PROP. FED. R. Evii. 3-03, Advisory Committee's
Note (Prelim. Draft 1969).
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there was no constitutional limitation, the committee readily de-
parted from Thayer's view of presumptions:
The so-called "bursting bubble" theory, under which a pre-
sumption vanishes upon the introduction of evidence which would
support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact, even
though not not believed, is rejected as according presumptions too
"slight and evanescent" an effect.45
It is interesting to note that the original draft of the rule spelled
out in detail the procedure to be followed. However the revised
rule as adopted by the Supreme Court was stated very simply:
Presumptions in General. In all cases not otherwise provided
for by Act of Congress or by these rules a presumption imposes
on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving
that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than
its existence.46
The only comment made by the committee which deleted two pages
of detailed procedural rules was that
It]he rule does not spell out the procedural aspects of its appli-
cation. Questions as to when the evidence warrants submission
of a presumption and what instructions are proper under varying
states of fact are believed to present no particular difficulties.4 7
At least one author felt the deleted procedural provisions would
be "useful for quick reference either to refresh minds in the midst
of a trial or to avoid the necessity of hasty research in support
of authority to make a directed finding."48
In effect, the Supreme Court adopted the Pennsylvania rule
with respect to the effect of a presumption. Until the trier of fact
finds that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable
than its existence, the presumed fact and the presumption remain
in effect.49 The effect of such a presumption is to shift the bur-
den of persuasion. 50 The rule has been criticized:
There is little logic in placing the persuasion on a party just
because he does not have the probabilities on his side. To do so
"confuses the problem of which party must persuade with the
problem of what proof is necessary for persuasion. Public policy
in addition to probabilities might justify shifting the burden, but
where this policy plays an important role in the presumption, the
45. PROP. FED. R. EviD. 3-03, Advisory Committee's Note (Prelim. Draft
1969).
46. PRop. FED. R. Evin. 301.
47. Id., Advisory Committee's Note.
48. Fornoff, Presumptions-The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 24
ARK. L. REv. 401, 409 (1971).
49. In re Grenet's Estate, 332 Pa. 111, 2 A.2d 707 (1938). See also Page
v. Phelps, 108 Conn. 572, 143 A. 890 (1928).
50. McCoRmwcK § 309.
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states-not the Supreme Court--can promulgate law dealing with
the burden of persuasion. Hopefully, states will adopt Professor
McCormick's progressive view that the burden of persuasion does
not arise until the jury reaches an impasse. Adopting such a view
not only makes the judge's duty to instruct the jury easier, but
also allows states to statutorily place the burden on one party or
the other depending on public policy. For example, states could
promulgate law which holds that where the jury reaches an im-
passe in a legitimacy case, the burden of persuasion would rest
with the defendant because of the public policy against the stigma
of bastardy.51
In spite of the foregoing, Professor Fornoff makes a respectable
argument in support of the Rule adopted by the Supreme Court:
In support of the provision for casting the burden on the op-
ponent, the Advisroy Committee relied upon the obvious inconsis-
tency of a rule which would give conclusive effect to the presump-
tion in the absence of substantial rebutting evidence, and yet cast
the presumption entirely out of the case "upon the introduction
of evidence which would support a finding of the nonexistence of
the presumed fact, even though not believed. . . ." Such a "burst-
ing bubble" theory if "rejected as according presumption too
'slight and evanescent an effect.'
More fundamental is the Advisory Committee's argument for
consistency with the basic principles of trial procedure generally:
The same considerations of fairness, policy, and probability
which dictate the allocation of the burden of the various
elements of a case as between the prima facie case of a
plaintiff and affirmative defenses also underlie the creation
of presumptions. These considerations are not satisfied by
giving a lesser effect to presumptions.
The acceptability of the Thayer doctrine not only in terms of
inconsistency of results, but also the policy problems to be met,
was raised over a decade ago by Dean Gausewitz. Writing first
about the Model Code of Evidence, he raised the question as to
whether the courts would stick to the Code provision incorporating
Thayer's doctrine. His answer was that in at least eleven different
situations, courts, after adhering to the Thayer doctrine, had de-
parted from it "under pressure of powerful policy reasons" which
had pushed them over the other rule, or further. Such a result
has followed in Arkansas, Ohio, and Maine. The painstaking re-
view of major presumption problems by the Maine court is not
only illuminating reading, but also a potent argument for taking
a fresh start.
Gausewitz agreed with Morgan and Bohlen that it would be
sounder doctrine to adopt for each presumption a rule as to effect
which would be consistent with the ground upon which the pre-
sumption was founded, but he approved the later trend toward
a single rule, concluding that the doctrinal appeal was offset by
the disadvantage of "encumbering procedures with a confusing
51. Comment, Judicial Notice and Presumptions Under the Proposed Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 135, 161 (1969).
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phethora of rules." His conclusion was in favor of a single rule
which shifted the burden of persuasion to the person against whom
the presumption operated.
Professor Morgan, in one of his last efforts at putting the pre-
sumption problems into work-a-day perspective, said:
Just as the courts have come to recognize that there is no a
priori formula for fixing the burden of persuasion, so they
should recognize that if there is a good reason for putting
on one party or the other the burden of going forward with
evidence-if it might not as well have been determined by
chance-it ought to be good enough to control a finding
when the mind of the trier is in equilibrium.52
There is much to be said for the foregoing view. A trend toward
a single rule seems to be a trend in the right direction.
The basic effect of an ordinary presumption would be to shift
the burden of persuasion. However, under the Federal Rule both
Congress and the state legislatures could provide a different effect
for any given presumption, if they had jurisdiction and so desired.
Rule 301 provides the effect of a presumption only "in cases not
otherwise provided for by Act of Congress" and Rule 302 specifi-
cally provides:
In civil actions, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact
which is an element of a claim or defense as to which state law
supplies the rule of decision is determined in accordance with state
law.
In support of the foregoing rule, the Advisory Committee refers
to a series of Supreme Court decisions in diversity cases leaving
no doubt about the relevance of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins53
to questions of burden of proof. State law controls where the bur-
den of proof question has to do with a substantive element of the
claim or defense.54
Although the Committee on the Judiciary was inclined to the
view that there should be basically one rule, it could not accept
the rule adopted by the Supreme Court. The Committee reported:
With respect to the weight to be given a presumption in a civil
case, the Committee agreed with the judgment implicit in the
Court's version that the so-called "bursting bubble" theory of pre-
sumptions, whereby a presumption vanishes upon the appearance
of any contradicting evidence by the other party, gives to pre-
sumptions too slight an effect. On the other hand, the Committee
52. Fornoff, Presumptions-The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 24
ARK. L. REv. 401, 409-10 (1971).
53. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
54. Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959); Palmer v. Hoff-
man, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Cities Serv, Oil Co. v, Dunlap, 308 U.S.
208 (1939).
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believed that the Rule proposed by the Court, whereby a presump-
tion permanently alters the burden of persuasion, no matter how
much contradicting evidence is introduced--a view adopted by
only a few courts-lends too great a force to presumptions. Ac-
cordingly, the Committee amended the Rule to adopt an inter-
mediate position under which a presumption does not vanish upon
the introduction of contradicting evidence, and does not change the
burden of persuasion; instead it is merely deemed sufficient evi-
dence of the fact presumed, to be considered by the jury or other
finder of fact.55
The Committee reported the following rule which was adopted by
the House of Representatives on February 6, 1974:
Rule 301. Presumptions in General in Civil Actions and Pro-
ceedings. In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise pro-
vided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption im-
posed on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going
forward with the evidence, and, even though met with contradict-
ing evidence, a presumption is sufficient evidence of the fact pre-
sumed, to be considered by the trier of the facts. 6
What the Senate will do with the House version of the Rule is
hard to predict. The problems created by presumptions led Thayer
long ago to remark that "among things too beset with ambiguity
there is abundant opportunity for him to stumble and fall who
does not pick his way and walk with caution."57
IV. THE NEBRASKA RULE
In October 1969, the Nebraska Supreme Court established a
committee to "undertake a study of modernized and simplified
rules of evidence for consideration by the bench and bar. '55 In
the area of presumptions, the committee was unable to locate any
modernized or simplified rules. However, the committee did have
the benefit of studies made in connection with the Model Code,
the Uniform Rules and the Federal Rules. These studies disclosed
that at least eight effects have been accorded presumptions by
courts. Three of these have merited extensive consideration over
the years. Under the first view, the mere introduction of evidence
which would warrant a finding of the nonexistence of the pre-
sumed fact dissipates the presumption. 9 According to the second
55. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
56. 120 CONG. REc. H546, H570 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
57. THAYER at 352.
58. Order of the Nebraska Supreme Court appointing Committee on
Practice and Procedure, October, 1969.
59. MODEL CODE rules 701-04; THAYER at 313-52; WiGmoPiE §§ 2487, 2491;
Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: an Essay on Juristic Immaturity,
12 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1959); Laughlin, The Location of the Burden of
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view, the artificial effect remains unless evidence of the nonexist-
ence of the presumed fact convinces the jury that its nonexistence
is at least as probable as its existence.60 Finally, under the third
view, the artificial effect remains until the jury is convinced that
the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its
existence.61
A. Civil Cases
For civil cases in general, the Nebraska committee has adopted
the third view following the final draft of the Federal Rules ap-
proved by the Supreme Court. Nebraska Rule 301 states:
Presumptions In General. In all cases not otherwise provided for
by statute or by these rules a presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonex-
istence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.
Although the Nebraska proposal was completed and submitted to
the Nebraska Supreme Court prior to the adoption of the House
version of Rule 301, the Nebraska committee probably would not
have adopted the House version which makes the presumption
"sufficient evidence of the presumed fact to be considered by the
trier of fact;" since a presumption is not evidence in Nebraska62
and the only presumption in Nebraska which even approaches the
House version is the rather anomalous presumption applied in res
ipsa loquitur cases.6 3 The Nebraska Rule is substantially identical
to the Pennsylvania Rule which is a long standing, workable and
time tested rule for civil cases.
B. Criminal Cases
The Nebraska rule applicable to criminal cases is similar to the
federal rule adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Nebraska Rule 303 provides:
(a) Scope. Except as otherwise provided by statute, in crimi-
nal cases, presumptions against an accused, recognized at common
Persuasion, 18 U. Prr. L. REv. 3 (1956); Laughlin, In Support of the
Thayer Theory of Presumption, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 195 (1953); Morgan,
Further Observations on Presumption, 16 S. CAL. L. REv. 245 (1943).
60. McBaine, Burden of Proof-Presumptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 13
(1954).
61. UnoRuvz RuLE 14(a); Levin, Pennsylvania and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence: Presumptions and Dead Man's Statutes, 103 U. PA. L. REv.
1, 20-24 (1954); Morgan, Presumptions, 10 RuTGEss L. Rnv. 512, 513-14
(1956).
62. In re Estate of Drake, 150 Neb. 568, 35 N.W.2d 417(1948).
63. Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co., 159 Neb. 23, 65 N.W.2d 224 (1954).
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law or created by statute, including statutory provisions that cer-
tain facts are prima facie evidence of other facts or of guilt, are
governed by this rule.
(b) Submission to Jury. The judge is not authorized to direct
the jury to find a presumed fact against the accused. When the
presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or
negatives a defense, the judge may submit the question of guilt
or of the existence of the presumed fact to the jury, if, but only
if, a reasonable juror on the evidence as a whole, including the
evidence of the basic facts, could find guilt or the presumed fact
beyond a reasonable doubt. When the presumed fact has a lesser
effect, its existence may be submitted to the jury if the basic facts
are supported by substantial evidence, or are otherwise estab-
lished, unless the evidence as a whole negatives the existence of
the presumed fact.
(c) Instructing the Jury. Whenever the existence of a pre-
sumed fact against the accused is submitted to the jury, the judge
shall give an instruction that the law declares that the jury may
regard the basic facts as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact
but does not require it to do so. In addition, if the presumed fact
establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a de-
fense, the judge shall instruct the jury that its existence must, on
all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
There is authority in Nebraska for the rule requiring a finding
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to the presumed
fact.6 4 The proposed rule meets the constitutional limitations of
Gainey. Although there is merit to the House decision to postpone
study and adoption of the Federal Rule until consideration of the
Revised Federal Criminal Code, the Nebraska Supreme Court com-
mittee anticipated this possibility and made the following com-
ment:
The Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws Sec. 103 (4) and (5) (1971) contains a care-
ful formulation of the consequences of a statutory presumption
with an alternative formulation set forth in the Comment thereto,
and also of the effect of a prima facie case. In the criminal code
there proposed, the terms "presumption" and "prima facie case"
are used with precision and with reference to these meanings. In
the federal criminal law as it stands today, these terms are not
used with precision. Moreover, common law presumptions con-
tinue. Hence it is believed that the rule here proposed is better
adapted to the present situation until such time as the Congress
enacts legislation covering the subject, which the rule takes into
account. If the subject of common law presumptions is not cov-
ered by legislation, the need for the rule in that regard will con-
tinue.65
64. Shellenberger v. State, 99 Neb. 370, 156 N.W. 777 (1916); Ballard v.
State, 19 Neb. 609, 28 N.W. 271 (1886).
65. PRop. NEB. R. Evm. 303, Comment.
364 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 53, NO. 3 (1974)
One final comment seems essential. The effect of a presump-
tion under the Nebraska Rule will only be effective to the extent
not otherwise provided by the legislative body having authority
to act. Thus, if Congress wants a presumption to have a different
effect in Nebraska for a federal cause of action being enforced in
state courts, Congress can so provide and under Nebraska Rule 302,
such federal law will control. Likewise, under Rules 301, relating
to civil cases, and 303, relating to criminal cases, the Legislature
can provide that in a particular case, there will be a specific type
of presumption which is to have a statutorily specified effect dif-
ferent from that provided in the rules. Such a legislatively de-
fined presumption will, 'by the terms of the Rules, supercede the
Rules. The Rules then, are a reasonable beginning, not an arbi-
trary end.
Current studies to modernize the existing rules of evidence be-
gan with the Model Code more than thirty years ago. Twenty
years have elapsed since the Uniform Rules were drafted. Study
of the Federal Rules is more than thirteen years in process. Yet,
to date there are no codified rules applicable in either state or fed-
eral courts in Nebraska. It seems that the time to begin is now;
and the place to begin is here.
